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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court initially had jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) . However, by order dated
February 17, 1994, the appeal was "poured-over" to the Utah Court of
Appeals, impliedly pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) . The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
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appeal

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel.

The trial court's findings of fact

regarding whether the right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently
waived will not overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.
v. Drobel,

815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

(Utah 1991).

State

836 P.2d 1383

However, the trial court's determination of whether the

right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently waived is reviewed
for correction of error.

See State

(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied,
v.

Pena,

869 P.2d

932, 940-41

v.

Palmer,

803 P.2d 1249, 1251

815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Cf.
(Utah 1994)

validly waived his or her Miranda
reviewed for correct of error); State

State

(whether a defendant

rights is a question of law
v.

Richardson,

843 P.2d 517,

518 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court's interpretation of binding case
law presents question of law that is reviewed for correctness);
v.

Thurman,

State

846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n.ll (Utah 1993) (trial court's

determination of whether consent to search is voluntary is question
of law that is reviewed for correction of error); State

v. Mabe,

864

P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (ultimate legal determination of whether a
confession is voluntary is conclusion of law, which is reviewed for
correctness).

Furthermore, whether the trial court utilized the

proper legal standard in reaching its determination as to a waiver is

5

id.

reviewed for correction of error.

("in

assessing the trial

court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, we afford it
no deference but apply a 'correction of error standard'"); State

v.

Bakalov,

in

part,

849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App.), rev'd
862 P.2d 1354 (1993); State

v.

in part

Bakalov,

and aff'd

862 P.2d 1354, 1355

(Utah 1993) . In such a case, the defendant bears the burden of proof
on appeal to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he
did not appropriately waive his right to counsel.
737 p.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987); State v. Hamilton,
(Utah 1986); State

v. Drobel,

State

v.

Frampton,

732 P.2d 505, 507

815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991).

This issue was not raised before the trial court.

In reviewing

Utah case law on the issue of waiver, counsel was unable to locate
any case discussing the waiver of the right to counsel in the context
of the well-established requirement that the issue must first be
raised before the trial court.

However, in an abundance of caution,

counsel includes as part of the instant appeal, for the reasons
stated below, how this appeal presents exceptional circumstances
and/or

circumstances

Archambeau,

constituting

plain

error.

See

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State

740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent
(Utah 1989).
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appeal,

v.

State

v.

Gibbons,

779 P.2d 1133

2.

Whether

Defendant's

right

to

self-representation

was

violated by the trial court's appointment of trial counsel as standby
counsel notwithstanding the obvious conflict of interest between
trial counsel and Defendant or by the trial court's failure to
address the conflict of interest issue.
ineffective

assistance

of

question of law and fact.

counsel
Strickland

698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984).

Similar to the review of an

claim,

the

issue

v. Washington,

is a mixed

466 U.S. 668,

Because there are no findings of

fact in the instant case as to this issue, the matter of whether
there was a conflict of interest or a waiver of such is a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness.
484, 487

(Utah App. 1991) .

State

v. Johnson,

823 P.2d

The plain error and/or exceptional

circumstances review is cited above and below in Argument I.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Utah Const. art. I, § 12
See case law cited above

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose

interpretation

7

is determinative, are set out

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information, Defendants Dwayne Johnson, Perry McDonald, and
Kal Johnson, were charged with Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and 76-3-203.1.
After continuances and delay due to transfer to another judge,
Defendant, on June 17, 1993, appeared with appointed counsel, William
J. Albright, for Preliminary Hearing before the Honorable Alfred C.
Van Wagenen, Second Circuit Court, after which Defendant was bound
over to the district court.
On June 29, 1993, Defendant appeared before the district court
for

arraignment,

during

which

Defendant

pleaded

not

guilty.

Thereafter, on July 20, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed
trial counsel, William J. Albright, for Pretrial Hearing before the
district court. On August 4, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed
trial counsel for jury trial.

After jury selection, Defendant's

appointed trial counsel requested an in-chambers conference, during
which Defendant expressed that trial counsel was unprepared for
trial.

The trial court informed Defendant of his right to act as his

own attorney.

After a brief colloquy, the trial court determined

that Defendant could act as his own attorney at trial, and that
8

appointed trial counsel would act as stand-by counsel at trial.
Following the jury trial, Defendants and his co-defendant, Dwayne
Johnson, were convicted of Aggravated Robbery.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five
years to life at the Utah State Prison and a fine of $10,000.
Defendant, through trial counsel, filed Notice of Appeal on September
16, 1993.

The trial court signed the Sentence on August 31, 1993,

which was filed on September 22, 1993.

On October 18, 1993, the

trial court signed the Judgment, which was filed that same day.
Thereafter,

on

January

25, 1994, appellate

appearance as new counsel on appeal.
through

new

appellate

counsel,

counsel

entered

an

On August 18, 1994, Defendant

filed

his

Rule

23B

Motion

and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 23B Motion
and the Affidavit of Perry McDonald in Support of Rule 23B Motion.
The Utah Court of Appeals granted Defendant's Rule 23B Motion by way
of Order on September 16, 1994, temporarily remanding the case to the
trial court "for the limited purpose of entry of findings of fact on
appellant's

claims

that

former

counsel's

pre-trial

actions

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel."
On January 24, 1995, counsel appeared before the trial court for
a status hearing, where the trial court set the Rule 23B evidentiary
hearing for March 8, 1995.

The trial court, on March 8, 1995, heard

9

evidence pertaining to Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, after which it took the matter under advisement.
The trial court, on April 28, 1995, signed its Findings of Fact
pursuant to the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, which was entered on
that same day.
proceedings

The record and transcript of the Rule 23B remand

were

transmitted

to the Utah

Court

of Appeals

for

inclusion as part of the record on appeal.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
1.

On

May

9,

1993,

at

approximately

11:40

p.m.,

two

individuals, each having a firearm, entered the Arctic Circle in
Clearfield, Utah, and took money from the business, as well as other
items of personal property from employees of the business (R. 14-15,
Information; R. 128-179, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I));
2.

At the Pretrial, on July 20, 1993, Defendant appeared with

appointed trial counsel, William J. Albright (R. 50, Transcript of
Pretrial Hearing).

After appointed trial counsel represented to the

trial

there

court

that

would

only

be

one

witness

called

on

Defendant's behalf, the following exchange between Defendant and the
court took place:
MR. ALBRIGHT:
Court.

Mr. McDonald had a question for the

10

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR, McDONALD: Yes. I would like to know what kind of
law am I standing in. Is this a constitutional right
or what is this, just a Maritime law or what?
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with Maritime laws.
You are under the laws of the State of Utah which are
statute in nature and guaranteed by both the
Constitution of this State and the United States.
MR. McDONALD:

All right.

(R. 55-56, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing);
3.

On August 4, 1993, Defendant appeared with appointed trial

counsel, William J. Albright, for jury trial (R. 29, Minute Entry; R.
62, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I));
4.

Following jury selection, Defendant requested to speak with

the trial court (R. 93, lines 18-19, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume
I) ) .

During the in-chambers conference, the following discussion

took place:
MR. MURPHY:
Judge [sic]

Mr. McDonald has asked to talk to you,

THE COURT: We are in chambers in the matter of State
of Utah vs. Perry McDonald. The defendant is present,
along with Mr. Albright and Carvel Harward from the
Davis County Attorney's Office. Mr. McDonald?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. I don't feel that I
am being properly counseled or as a lawyer being, you
know, as far as discussing the matter, because for a
fact number one, he did not get in touch with me any
time during the week to even discuss or go over
things. He just, you know, like I come to court now,
just to go to trial, then he comes and says this and
11

that, but we did not go over no battle plans or any
such thing.
Then, two, the DA brings in coats and jackets
that he did not prevail doing in my preliminary
hearing, and that I am not getting proper counseling.
My lawyer did not go over any kind of battle plans or
get me prepared for this. He was going to make me a
bargain, which I did not -- I didn't want to take it.
So he did not come and discuss no common battle plans
to me. I am not prepared. I really think he is not
prepared to go on in this case right now.
THE COURT:

Mr. Albright.

MR. ALBRIGHT: Your Honor, I take a position opposite
to that, and that puts me in an awkward situation,
because I am here to represent him.
THE COURT:
have been.

You need to represent what your efforts

MR. ALBRIGHT: Okay. I have been to the jail at least
three times to visit him and discuss the case. I
provided him with all the police reports, all
preliminary hearing transcripts, and I have reviewed
all of that material with him. I have taken at least
eights phone calls collect from him at my own expense,
paid for those phone calls. I have had at least a
half dozen phone calls from relatives. I have had —
and I have been happy to talk to all his relatives
regarding the case, and they have relayed messages to
me from him when they felt that it was appropriate.
We discussed the plea bargain about three or four days
beforehand with a jail visit. He informed me he was
going to take the plea. I talked to him before we
went into court and I sat down and we discussed the
plea bargain about three or four days beforehand with
a jail visit. He informed me he was going to take the
plea. I talked to him before we went into court and
I sat down and we reviewed all the evidence one more
time and he, at that time, told me he would take the
plea. When we went into court he changed his mind,
which is his right, and decided at that time that he
would go to trial.
12

I am prepared at this time, because of our
previous --my previous jail visits, previously going
over the preliminary hearing transcript and all of the
police reports, which also I did do, I did personally
do the preliminary hearing, so I have seen the
evidence. I met with Mr. Harward numerous times on
this. In fact, he has provided me with full access to
his file, which he has had an open file. I have been
to his office at least three times and reviewed the
complete file, and I have had probably three or four
conversations, two of which I have sat down and in Mr.
Harward's office to review the evidence that he would
be presenting. In fact, I think it was two days ago
that Mr. Harward and myself reviewed completely his
case in chief, and I also at that time discussed with
him what my plan was of the evidence that I would
present during the trial and my theory of the case.
So we have -- my relationship with the prosecutor's
office has been full disclosure and I have been
prepared on this matter as of last week.
THE COURT:

Mr. McDonald?

MR. McDONALD:
Just like he said, he has been
prepared, but he hasn't prepared me. I am the one
that is going to have to go up and do a five to life.
THE COURT: I don't know what more preparation you
would make, Mr. McDonald. Are you going to testify?
MR. McDONALD:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well, then, you have a right to go over
that and there is plenty of time to do that [sic]
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question,
myself, the people that he puts on the stand?
THE COURT:
want to.

You can act as your own attorney if you

MR. McDONALD:

Okay [sic]

13

MR. ALBRIGHT:
I would be happy to sit there and
advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he
prefers to represent himself.
THE

COURT:

Do you prefer to represent yourself?

MR. MCDONALD:

Tr

-s, sir.

THE COURT: I «
~t-„w yc u to do that and make your
questioning. You need to understand, however, that
you will be required to abide by the same rules of
evidence as any attorney would be. Have you. been to
court before?
™v • JICDONALD :

Y es ,

THE COURT: How many rimes nave you been
before? H v - <- • ---- ..h^^^u
>—^?
MR. MCDONALD:
have.
THE fX)!JPT"
ni HI

N

: have se-.r. t

f

MCDONALD :

:

: ;al before, yes, I

• | ^-M '-I.'.'M* ' " \ " "ii i n v o l v e d i n o n e ?
i'"

*„± U'JUKI': Have you been there wl len questions were
a ---i «• ; responses were given?
cDONALDi
THE

COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

I U U IJ.J.«-

ouiii*-..-

k i n i ^ 1 < -I'-K

t liei

I

M

I P S

of evidence?
'MR.

MCDONALD •

"--

~-r

THE COUregard?
MR. MCDONALD:

; .'.-s required

in that

Yes.

THE COURT; 'I'CU realize chat this is a serious case
and that the evidence that would be presented is going
to be critical in this matter?
34

MR, MCDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to
proceed and act as your own attorney?
MR. MCDONALD:
THE COURT:
McDonald?

How much education have you had, Mr.

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

I graduated, your Honor.

From what?

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

From high school.

Have you had any college experience?

MR. McDONALD:

No, sir.

THE COURT:
Do you read, write and understand the
English language?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:
that true?

Yes.

And you appear to be very articulate, is

MR. McDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own
attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here.
MR. McDONALD:

Yes, I would like for him to be there.

THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening
argument for you?
MR. McDONALD:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. You can proceed and I will ask you
to -- you may ask questions or may ask him to ask them for
you, however you feel most comfortable.

15

MR. MCDONALD:
" ^ COURT:

_ ^

But he will remain there and be there to assist

MR, MC^ONAI.

• .^

(RB 93_99r j ur y Trial Transcript (Volume I))

Thereafter, Defendant

changed his mind and chose not to have Mr. Al^n^nt give the opening
argument

] 20,

Notwithstanding the tact. -'"u Defendant initially appeared

5
at

day

'_ : . J .

i.:j

-T'lry Trial Transcript (Volume I));

of

•

trial

:

.

. .

•• .

t h e trial

.

court

r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f at t r ^ . . ;
wh-'-h^-'- ir

--^r

^ r*

.-•-

determined

t.ie t_

*--*

that

Defendant

could

ci^-i

)

e of continuance might b e n e c e s s a r y for D e f e n d a n t , p r o

se, t o a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e f o r t h e jury t r i a l ;
6.

Defender'

•

J o h n s o n , w h o w a s represented
Murphy

L-

Transcript
7.

", H I nut • MIH J /

-r '.. -. - ;-:-- with co-defendant, Dwayne
r:y a p p o i n t e d
i

"

t r i a 1,

t he

trial

I int"

counsel,
i

i i

Michael

MM

IV i =I 1

(Volume I ) ) ;
D u ring

t h e j u ry

p i: c s e c u t :i : i I s • :: a s e i i i ::: 1 i i e f

c o n s u m e d o n e full day, d u r i n g w h i c h ^he p r o s e c u t i o n c a l l e d
w i t n e s s e s a n d offered over twenty exhiLic.
Ji i! y T V i r\ 1 l '' ri •>! unit - | ,i i ;

16

twelve

. 410, Transcript of

8.

At one point during that first day of the jury trial, after

a lengthy discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning
side bar conferences and whether or not proper Miranda
been administered by the police

in the instant

interjected with the following comment:

warnings had

case, Defendant

"Your Honor, I don't know

really about what all of these big words is going on, but the last
officer he did not read me my Miranda

rights at all.

He just went

right into questions." (R. 308, lines 18-21, Jury Trial Transcript
(Volume I) ) ;
9.

On the second day of the jury trial, while Defendant

presented his case-in-chief and attempted to refer to the police
report, the following exchange took place:
MR. McDONALD: I would like to show this paper, this
police report to the jury.
THE COURT: It's not offered, you can't show it to
them, Mr. McDonald.
MR. McDONALD: I would like to refer to the police
report. Can I?
THE COURT:
You cannot refer to the police report
unless you do it through the witness who wrote it.
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Is that witness here?

I don't know who wrote it.

MR. McDONALD:

It says Clearfield Police Department.

THE COURT: That doesn't tell you who wrote it, which
of the officers wrote it. At any rate, you can't use
17

it with this witness.
other w i t n e s s .
1 II !! 1 1 .DONA 1 .i:
(R . 4 0 0 - 4 01,

Jury

11 ]

Tr i a 1

You've got to use it with some

i ght

Transcript

(Vo lume

Def endai it • id :I i I : t a t t e i i: ip 1:

II)) .
. _ .

r

The re a f t e r,
. • ;...-„._.

no indication in the record that standby counsel attempted to assist
Defendant in referring to the police report as evidence;
MI

The

-y ciiai cranscripts are completely devoid of

any

indication that former appointed trial counsel, who was also standby
ji 1:1 : y t::i : :i a ] ,

u , . ,.-,e] du:: . • '

E;

of the jury trial

;R. ':C-500, Jury Trial Transcript

II) )

I l L.-.

.

EELS si

, 3 ted Defendant :ii n :i ng the course

..*..•_, ~_

(Volumes I and

,, - ,.

.

, ght.

as •

standby counsel., askeri ----«- 'IP be excused inasmuch as he felt that
Defendant would not need 1 sgal advice for Closing Arguments
J .•

""- : i" fTM;anscricr
11.

con .:;•_-12.

(R

162,

Volume II) ) ;

After the jury trial, Defendant and his co-defendant were
i. :
Or. August 31,

" ' -^ = "* * '
1993, Defendant was sentenced, t ~- rive years

to life at tl: u i IJtal: i Si .at .< E: 3= i isoi l • EH i i f I .€ : i $1 0 000 (1 1
R. 4 2 - 4 3 , J u d g m e n t ) .

3 ; Se nl : .< a ::L ze , •

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
advise

The trial court, among other things, failed to adequately
Defendant

representation.

of

the

As

a

dangers
result,

and

disadvantages

Defendant

did

not

of

self-

knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel.

By failing to adequately determine whether

there was a valid waiver, the trial court failed in its duty to
determine if the waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and
intelligently made.

In the course of the exchange as to self-

representation, the trial court erred by focusing almost exclusively
on Defendant's background, and thereby utilized the wrong standard
for

determining whether Defendant validly waived the right to

assistance of counsel.
2.
standby
failed

The trial court, by appointing former trial counsel as
counsel
to

to assist Defendant

preserve

Defendant's

in his

self-representation,

Sixth Amendment

right

to

self-

representation and violation Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation.

Reversal is required by the trial court's

failure to address the conflict of interest issue inasmuch as it knew
or should have reasonably known about the conflict
situation.
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of

interest

ARGUMENTS
i-na iKiAL COURT, BASED ON" T H E FACTS A N D CIRCUMSTANCES
B E F O R E I T , ERRED I N ITS D E T E R M I N A T I O N T H A T D E F E N D A N T
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, A N D V O L U N T A R I L Y W A I V E D H I S
R I G H T T O COUNSEL..

"T h e r i g 1 11: t •• : • :i : e p r e s e n t: :> n e s e 1 f :i i i a • ::: i :i i i i :i i i a ] p r o c e e d i n g :i s ;
;;! , California,

In Faretta

established.

(197 5) , the Unite' I States

422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525

Supr erne C :>i i i I :

.• : -t- = I til: lat

A m e n d m e n t t o the United States Constitution, 1 which gives

t!l: le

S:i : ctl i

criminal

defendants the means t o put o n a defense, _;;p^iea^y guarantees the
.,^&-^ >. acci lsed to represent himself, without c o u n s e l ,

ric

Id. a : 818-1?, ~" S.~t. at 2533; see

in criminal p r o c e e d i n g s .
Stct.'.

also

'l

right zc conduce his cwn defense "must

he respected

and guarded

by

the courts

in harmony wi th the righ t t :
> as si s tai ice : -f

• :: -ounsel

guaranteed

by

P. 2d

the

(emphasis added).
proceeding
State

law.
£ di

sixth

amendment."

ml

~~ ~-~v,*. +-0 represent onese^i

- TV-^*
'

Bakalov,

i_ .

..minguez.

187

_n a criminal

b~ J r;. 2d G2^, 632-33 (Utah App )
•

.

at

i i v the Utah Constitution and other Utah

"
"

P.2d 505, 50"7 [Utah 1386'; State
1981) ; State

Frampton, " 73 7

a I so

v. Rupie,

'

rev'd in
732

631 ?.2d -3 -, -'- lUtah

-. • : . ;

:1

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy thp right to
. have the Assistance of counsel for his defence."
20

Wilson,

563 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977); State v. Penderville,

2

Utah 2d 281, 288, 272 P.2d 195, 199 (1954); Utah Const, art. I, § 12;2
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(a).3
The right to assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and
may be waived by a competent accused if the waiver
intelligently'
Argersinger
Johnson

v. Hamlin,

v. Zerbst,

Ruple,

made."

Frampton,

737 P. 2d

is ^knowingly
at 187;

see

and
also

407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972);

304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938);

631 P.2d at 875-76; Wilson,

563 P.2d at 793-94.

Because the

accused's decision to defend himself is a waiver of the right to
assistance of counsel, the trial court has a "duty to determine if
the waiver is a voluntary one which is knowingly and intelligently
made."
724,

Frampton,

737 P.2d 187; see also

731 (Utah App. 1991)

State

(stating that

v. Drobel,

815 P.2d

"trial courts have an

affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who chooses selfrepresentation does so knowingly and intelligently"). A knowing and
intelligent waiver is required because " [w] hen an accused manages his
own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the

2

Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel . . . ."
3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a)
prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
defend in person or by counsel."
21

provides: "In criminal
To appear in person and

Faretta,

traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel
422 U . S . at 3^5, 95 S. Ct. at 254]
waiver,

the accused

u

should

be

In making this determination or
made

aware

the

dangers

and

disadvantages

< of

establish tint

"HP tin.vw; win'

eyes open,

Faretta, 422 U.3 ar Sit, * .- . Ct. at 2541 (quoting

Adams v. [ i hi ted

self-representation,

of

Stales

1|

" " -' ^^^^>i

an

the

record

w:_

^- i his choice is made with

appropriate

waives

Ordinarily, the information for
"can

only

rp:'-ur-^:r.": questioning by the trial court.
187

that

ex i

236, 241 (1942) (emphasis added,, .
determining

so

he

elicited

Frampton,

alter

737 P.2d at

.'rierefore, i -olloquy on the record, between the court and the

a _.. . o -

------ vr e d me t h od • : • f a s c e i !:: a i n i i lg !:: 1: le

r a 1 :i • i i t A,r o i

waiver because it insures that defendants understand the risks of
self-representarr:

. .•

.i-:. -•

w h i c h appeals may be limited.

__:.

^ s a auide for ascertaining a

valid waiver, the Utah Supreme Court, in Frampton,
E^" ,:- ~
to ~r5

!

quotea irom the

'•'. : jr United States District Court Judges, v o l . 1 §§ 1.02-2
Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 1 9 8 6 ) , which provides:
A n accused has a constitutional right to
represent himself if he chooses to do so
A.
defendant's waiver of counsel must, however, be
knowing and voluntary. This means that you must
make clear
on the record
that the defendant
is
fully
aware of the hazards
that he faces and the
disadvantages
of
self-representation.
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When a defendant states that he wishes to
represent himself, you should therefore ask
questions similar to the following:
(a) Have you ever studied law?
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or
any other defendant in a criminal action?
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are
charged with these crimes: (Here state the
crimes
with
which
the
defendant
is
charged.)
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you
are found guilty of the crime charged in
Count I, the court . . . could sentence you
to as much as
years in prison and fine
you as much as $
? (Then ask him
similar questions with respect to each
other crime with which he may be charged in
the indictment or information.)
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you
are found guilty of more than one of those
crimes this court can order that the
sentences be served consecutively, that is,
one after another?
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you
represent yourself, you are on your own? I
cannot tell you how you should try your
case or even advise you as to how to try
your case.
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules
of Evidence
(h) Your realize, do you not, that the . .
. Rules of Evidence govern what evidence
may or may not be introduced at trial and,
in representing yourself, you must abide by
those rules?
(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules
of Criminal Procedure?
(j) You realize, do you not, that those
rules govern the way in which a criminal
action is tried in . . . court?
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you
decide to take the witness stand, you must
present your testimony by asking questions
of yourself?
You cannot just take the

23

stand
and tell your
story.
You
must
proceed question by question through your
testimony
(1)
(Then say to the defendant something
to this effect) • I must advise you that in
my opinion you would be far better defended
by a trained lawyer than y o u can be by
yourself.
I think it is unwise of you to
try to represent yourself
You are not
familiar
with
the
law
.ot
familiar with court procedure. You are not
familiar with the Rules of E v i d e n c e .
I
w o u l d strongly urge you not to try to
represent yourself.
(m) Now, :i n light of the penalty that yG'U
might suffer if you are found guilty and in
light
of
all
the
difficulties
of
representing yourself, is it still your
desire to represent yourself and to give up
your right to be represented by a lawyer?
(n)
Is your decision entirely voluntary on
your part?
(o)
If the answers to the two preceding
questions
are
in
the
affirmative,
you
should then say something to the following
effect;
"I find that the defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel.
I will therefore permit him to
represent himself."
(p) You should consider the appointment of
standby counsel to assist the defendant and
to
replace
him
if
the
court
should
determine during trial that the defendant
can no longer be permitted to represent
himself.
Frampton,

737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12.

While the aforementioned

sixteen

points are not mandatory, the Utah Supreme Court suggested that
pre ^ n de

a

i KE; = fi il

framework

to

insure

2 3

that

there

is

a

they

voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent waiver of the fundamental constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel.

Drobel,

815 P.2d at 732 n.14.

Absent such a colloquy, the appellate court will look at any
evidence in the record that shows a defendant's actual awareness of
the risks of proceeding pro se.

Id.

at 188.

"[W]hether a knowing

and intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding each case."

Id.

While a defendant's background is relevant to his ability to
waive his right to counsel, a defendant's background
is not relevant to show whether a sensible,
literate, and intelligent defendant possesses
the necessary information to make a meaningful
decision as to waiver of counsel. The fact that
a defendant is well educated, can read, or has
been on trial previously is not dispositive as
to whether he understood the relative advantages
and disadvantages of self-representation in a
particular situation.
In the absence of a colloquy, the record
must somehow otherwise show that the defendant
understood the seriousness of the charges and
knew the possible maximum penalty. The record
should also show that the defendant was aware of
the existence of technical rules and that
presenting a defense is not just a matter of
telling one's story.
Frampton,

737 P.2d at 188 (quoting City of

Bellevue

v.

Acrey,

103

Wash.2d 203, 211, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en banc)).
The issue of whether there was a valid waiver is raised for the
first time on appeal.

Although there are no cases discussing the
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failure to raise the waiver issue to the trial court, ordinarily, the
failure

to

raise

an

issue

before

consideration of the issue on appeal.
566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).

the

trial

State

v.

court

Jennings,

precludes
875 P.2d

There are, however, two limited but well-

established exceptions to this general rule.
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

State

v.

Archambeau,

The appellate court may address

an issue for the first time on appeal if the trial court committed
plain error or there are exceptional circumstances.
In State
814,

v. Eldredge,

110 S.Ct.

62

Id.

773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied,

(1989),

the Utah Supreme

493 U.S.

Court outlined

the

following principles involved in determining whether "plain error"
exists:
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from
our examination of the record, we must be able
to say that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error . . . .
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement
for a finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused,
i.e., that the error be harmful.
Id.

at 35.

According to State

v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah

1989) , "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain error'
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and
elaborated upon in Eldredge

. . . ."
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The

second

exception

is

the

catch-all

Archambeau,

''exceptional'' or unusual" circumstances.
923.

device

requiring

820 P. 2d at

This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that

manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an
issue on appeal."

Id.

As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial
court committed plain error in the course of its colloquy about the
waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel by the obvious
failure to comply with the requirements of the standards set forth in
Faretta and

Frampton.

Based on the inadequate colloquy between the trial court and
Defendant, which evidences numerous failures to comply with the
constitutional and procedural requirements of determining a valid
waiver, it should have been obvious to the trial court that it was
committing error.
P. 2d at 876.

See Frampton,

837 P. 2d at 187 & n.12; Ruple,

631

That such an error was plain or obvious is supported by

case law, which holds that "it is the trial court's duty to determine
if

this

waiver

is

a

Frampton,

intelligently made."
failure

of

determining

the

trial

a valid

voluntary

court

waiver

one

which

is

837 P. 2d at 187.
to

comply

affected

the

with

the

knowingly

and

Secondly, the
standards

substantial

rights

of
of

Defendant by failing to insure that Defendant waived his right to the
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assistance of counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently prior
to waiving the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances.

Defendant, for all

intents and purposes, was not represented by counsel during the inchambers conference when the exchange as to waiver took place.
Consequently, Defendant, who was pro se litigant, was extremely
unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural requirements with
which the trial court was required to comply in the course of
determining a valid waiver.
constitutional concern.

Requirements that are of momentous

To not consider and correct this matter on

appeal would result in a great and manifest injustice or harm by
failing to protect the constitutional right invalidly waived by
Defendant, a pro se litigant, as a result of the trial court's
failures.
In the instant case, during an in-chambers discussion initiated
by Defendant after jury selection, Defendant complained to the trial
court

about

the

lack

of preparation

by

trial

counsel.

After

Defendant complained about trial counsel's lack of preparation, the
following exchange took place:
THE COURT: I don't know what more preparation you
would make, Mr. McDonald. Are you going to testify?
MR. MCDONALD:

Yes, sir.
28

THE COURT: Well, then, you have a right to go over
that and there is plenty of time to do that [sic]
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question,
myself, the people that he puts on the stand?
THE COURT:
want to.

You can act as your own attorney if you

MR. McDONALD:

Okay [sic]

MR. ALBRIGHT:
I would be happy to sit there and
advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he
prefers to represent himself.
THE COURT:

Do you prefer to represent yourself?

MR. McDONALD:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I will allow you to do that and make your
questioning. You need to understand, however, that
you will be required to abide by the same rules of
evidence as any attorney would be. Have you been to
court before?
MR. McDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT:
How many times have you been in court
before? Have you been through a trial?
MR. McDONALD:
have.
THE COURT:

I have seen a trial before, yes, I

Have you personally been involved in one?

MR. McDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT: Have you been there when questions were
asked and responses were given?
MR. McDONALD:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You have some knowledge then of the rules
of evidence?
29

MR, MCDONALD:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you know what's required
regard?
MR. MCDONALD:

in that

Yes.

THE COURT: You realize that this is a serious case
and that the evidence that would be presented is going
to be critical in this matter?
MR. MCDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to
proceed and act as your own attorney?
MR. MCDONALD:
THE COURT:
McDonald?

How much education have you had, Mr.

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

I graduated, your Honor.

From what?

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

From high school.

Have you had any college experience?

MR. McDONALD:

No, sir.

THE COURT:
Do you read, write and understand the
English language?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:
that true?

Yes.

And you appear to be very articulate, is

MR. McDONALD:

Yes.

THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own
attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here.
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MR. MCDONALD:

Yes, I would like for him to be there.

THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening
argument for you?
MR. MCDONALD:

Yes, sir.

(R. 96-98, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume I)).
As evidenced by the aforementioned exchange, the trial court
failed to sufficiently question Defendant so as to make him aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

By so doing,

the trial court failed to make clear on the record that Defendant was
fully aware of the hazards that he faced and the disadvantages of
self-representation.
Utilizing the sixteen points set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
as a guideline for determining the validity of a waiver, the trial
court (1) failed to inquire of Defendant as to whether he understood
the crimes with which he had been charged and the possible sentences
that could be imposed in the event that he was found guilty (see
Frampton,

737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12

(points

(c) , (d) , and

(e) in

footnote 12) ; (2) failed to inform Defendant that if he chose to
represent himself, he would be on his own, and that the court would
not assist or advise him of how to try his case (Id.

point (f) in

footnote 12) ; (3) failed to inquire as to whether Defendant was
familiar with the Rule of Criminal Procedure, and that "those rules
31

govern the way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court"
(Id.

(points

(i) and

(j) in footnote 12); (4) failed to inform

Defendant that if he took the witness stand, he would have to his own
testimony by asking questions of himself, and that he could not "just
take the stand and tell" his story" (Id.
and

(5) failed to advise Defendant

opinion, Defendant

"would be

(point (k) of footnote 12) ;
that, in the trial

far better

defended

by a

court's
trained

lawyer", and that it would be unwise for Defendant to attempt selfrepresentation

because

he

is not

familiar with

procedure, or the rules of evidence (Id.

the

law, court

(point (1) of footnote 12) ;

(6) failed to "strongly urge" that Defendant not try to represent
himself (Id.

(point (1) of footnote 12); and (7) failed to inquire

whether Defendant's decision to represent himself, in light of the
penalties that might be suffered if found guilty, was "entirely
voluntary" (Id.

(points (m) and (n) of footnote 12). By failing to

inquire

the

as

to

aforementioned

points

as

a

guideline

for

determining waiver, the trial court breached its "duty" to determine
if Defendant's waiver was "a voluntary one which [was] knowingly and
intelligently made."
724,

731

Id.

at 187; accord

(Utah App. 1991)

State

(stating that

v.

Drobel,

815 P.2d

"trial courts have an

affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who chooses selfrepresentation does so knowingly and intelligently").
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In the instant case, the trial court's questions focused, almost
exclusively,

on

Defendant's

background

(R.

96-98,

Jury

Trial

Transcript (Volume I) ) . "The fact that a defendant is well educated,
can read, or has been on trial previously is not dispositive as to
whether he understood the relative advantages or disadvantages of
self-representation in a particular situation."
at 188 (quoting City

of Bellevue

P.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en banc)).

v. Acrey,

Frampton,

103 Wash.2d 203, 211, 691

To establish a valid waiver, it is

incumbent upon the trial court to show on the record
defendant understood the seriousness
possible

maximum

defendant
presenting
Id.

penalty.

is not just

(emphasis added).

of

the

charges

"that the

and

knew

the

The record should also show that the

was aware of the existence
a defense

737 P.2d

of technical

a matter

rules

of telling

one's

and

that

story."

The record indicates that the trial court

failed to establish that Defendant understood the seriousness of the
charges and knew the possible criminal penalties and enhancements4
that could be imposed upon him by way of sentencing.

While it is

true that Defendant had some knowledge about the criminal penalties
that could be imposed, (R. 96, lines 8-10, Transcript of Jury Trial
(Volume I)), Defendant was in no way understood or was aware of the
full gambit of the penalties and enhancements that could be imposed

4

See R. 505, lines 4-12, Sentencing Transcript.
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in the event that he was found guilty, of which the trial court had
a duty to advise Defendant.
of Bellevue

v. Acrey,

(en banc)).

Because

Frampton,

737 P.2d at 188 (quoting City

103 Wash.2d 203, 211, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (1984)
the trial court basically

focused on the

background of Defendant in determining whether there was a valid
waiver,5 the trial court utilized the wrong standard to determine a
waiver of the constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Whether
the trial court utilized the proper legal standard in reaching its
decision as to a valid waiver is a question of law, which is reviewed
for correction of error.

See State

(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied,
Bakalov,
part,

v.

Palmer,

815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v.

849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App.), rev'd
862 P.2d 1354 (1993); State

(Utah 1993); Cf.

State

v.

Pena,

803 P.2d 1249, 1251

v.

Bakalov,

in part

and aff'd

in

862 P.2d 1354, 1355

869 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Utah 1994)

5

The trial court's apparent focus on Defendant's background, to
the exclusion of the other Frampton points, is especially troubling
in light of the following exchange between Defendant and the trial
court during the Pretrial Hearing in the instant case:
MR. ALBRIGHT: Mr. McDonald had a question for the
Court.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like to know what kind of
law am I standing in. Is this a constitutional right
or what is this, just a Maritime law or what?
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with Maritime laws.
You are under the laws of the State of Utah which are
statute in nature and guaranteed by both the
Constitution of this State and the United States.
MR. McDONALD: All right.
(R. 55-56, Transcript of Pretrial Hearing).
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(whether a defendant validly waived his or her Miranda
question of law reviewed for correct of error); State

rights is a
Richardson,

v.

843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court's interpretation of
binding case law presents question of law that is reviewed for
correctness); State

v.

Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n.ll (Utah

1993) (trial court's determination of whether consent to search is
voluntary is question of law that is reviewed for correction of
error); State

v. Mabe,

864 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (ultimate legal

determination of whether a confession is voluntary is conclusion of
law, which is reviewed for correctness).
In State

v. Ruple,

631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981), after the defendant

choose to represent himself, the trial court briefly explained to the
defendant the procedure to be followed for the balance of the trial.
Id.

at

875.

In

the

course

of

reversing

the

trial

court's

determination of waiver and remanding for a new trial, the Utah
Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court M i d not discuss with
the defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
[The trial court] did not advise the defendant that it is generally
advisable to have a lawyer who is skilled and trained in the law, and
[it] did not point out to the defendant any of the hazards he may
encounter by acting pro se."

Id.

at 876; Cf.

Drobel,

815 P. 2d at

730, 732 (affirminq trial court's determination of waiver due to the
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record

wherein trial court's "careful colloquys" with the defendant

followed

the points

verbatim");

set

State

and

in Frampton

forth
v.

Dominquez,

"in essence

564 P.2d

768

if not

(Utah 1977)

(affirming the defendant's waiver of the right to the assistance of
counsel in light of the defendant's being fully advised of the
dangers
attorney

and disadvantages
and

the

trial

of proceeding
court's

without

meticulous

the aid

questioning

of
of

an
the

defendant).
Similarly,
discuss

with

in the instant case, the trial court

Defendant

representation.

the

dangers

and

disadvantages

failed to
of

self-

In addition, the trial court, in contravention to

the recommended guidelines set forth in Frampton,

did not advise

Defendant that it is generally advisable to have a lawyer who is
skilled and trained in the law.

Finally, the trial court did not

point out to Defendant any of the hazards he may encounter by acting
pro se.
Because the trial court, among other things, failed to discuss
with Defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,
an appellate court is unable to assess whether Defendant validly
waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
State

v. Bakalov,

see also

McKaskle

862 P.2d at 1355 (citing Bakalov,
v.

Wiggins,

See

849 P.2d at 637);

465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944,
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950 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of self-representation is a right
that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial
outcome unfavorable to the defendant, it s denial is not amenable to
"harmless error" analysis.
deprivation

The right is either respected denied; its

cannot be harmless").

In light of the

fundamental

constitutional right involved and the inadequate colloquy by the
trial counsel as to the waiver of that right, the only fair way to
proceed is to vacate Defendant's conviction and remand the matter for
retrial.

2.

Cf.

State

v.

Rameriz,

817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991).

THE TRIAL COURT, BY APPOINTING FORMER TRIAL COUNSEL AS
STANDBY COUNSEL TO ASSIST DEFENDANT IN HIS SELFREPRESENTATION, FAILED TO PRESERVE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AND VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S
SIXTH
AMENDMENT
RIGHT
TO
SELFREPRESENTATION .

The United States Supreme Court, in Faretta

v.

California,

422

U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975), noted that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which gives criminal defendants the means
to put on a defense, impliedly guarantees the right of a competent
accused

to

represent

proceedings.
Frampton,

Id.

himself,

without

in

at 818-19, 95 S.Ct. at 2533/ see also

737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987).

conduct his own defense "must be respected
in harmony with

counsel,

the right

to assistance
37

criminal
State

v.

The accused's right to

and guarded by the
of counsel,

also

courts

guaranteed

by the sixth

amendment."

Frampton,

737 P.2d at 187 (emphasis added) .

As part of that right, the United States Supreme Court, in

Faretta,

recognized that a trial court "may -- even over objection by the
accused -- appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused if and when
the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the
accused

in the event that termination of the defendant's self-

representation is necessary."

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95

S.Ct. at 2541 n.4&; see also

Frampton,

737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12

(quoting Bench Book for the United States District Court Judges,
which, as part of the guidelines for the colloquy concerning waiver
of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, the trial
court "should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist
the defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during
trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted to represent
himself"); and State

v.

Bakalov,

862 P.2d 1354, 1355

(Utah 1993)

(urging the trial court, upon remand, "to appoint standby counsel to

preserve

[the defendant's] right

preclude

subsequent

assistance
Like

of

claims

of

to
lack

self-representation
of

waiver

or

and

to

ineffective

counsel."

the Sixth Amendment

right

to effective

assistance of

counsel, the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation can be
violated, per se, by an actual conflict of interest between standby
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counsel and the client.
U.S.

See and cf.

Strickland

668, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067

v.

(1984)

Washington,

466

(actual conflict of

interest can result in per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel) .
A Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest, like
that in the instant case, should be analyzed in the same fashion as
a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
conflict

of

interest

inasmuch

as

both

involve

fundamental

constitutional rights. The effective performance of standby counsel,
like

that

of

other

cases

concerning

effective

representation,

"requires the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of
interest."

United

States

v.

Tatum,

943 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1991).

A

defendant that does not object to the conflict of interest at trial
"has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with specificity that

uS

an

actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his [or
her] lawyer's performance.'"
App. 1990) (quoting Cuyler

State

v. Webb,

v. Sullivan,

790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah

446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct.

1708, 1718 (1980)) . If such a showing is made, prejudice need not be
demonstrated to prevail on this claim.
484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Cuyler,
S.Ct. at 1718-19).

In Tatum,

State

v.

Johnson,

823 P.2d

446 U.S. at 349-50, 100

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
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stated the following as to the existence of an actual conflict of
interest:
An attorney has an actual conflict of interest
when
he
actively
represents
conflicting
interests . . . . When the attorney is actively
engaged in legal representation which requires
him to account to two masters, an actual
conflict exists when it can be shown that he
took action on behalf of one. The effect of his
action of necessity will adversely affect the
appropriate defense of the other. Moreover, an
adverse effect may not always be revealed from a
review of the affirmative actions taken.
Rather, the failure to take actions that are
clearly suggested from the circumstances can be
as revealing.
Tatum,

943 F.2d at 375-76.
The prevailing professional and ethical standards are applicable

to the

instant

case.

Rule 1.7(b), Utah Rules of

Professional

Conduct, states in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by . . . the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2)
Each client consents after consultation."

Utah Rule of Professional

Conduct 8.4(d) addresses the institutional interest in ensuring that
just verdicts are rendered in criminal cases --an interest that may
be jeopardized by the existence of conflicts of interest.
United

States,

Wheat

486 U.S. 153, 158 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988).
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v.

At the point the risk of a conflict of interest is brought to
the trial court's attention, "the court has the responsibility to
investigate
receive

further, to advise the defendant personally, and to

a knowing waiver if that is the expressed wish of the

defendant."

Id.

at 379.

"Upon the trial court rests the duty of

seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential
rights of the accused . . . ."

Hollaway

v. Arkansas,

484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (1978) (quoting Glasser
315 U.S. 60, 71, 62 S.Ct. 457, 465 (1942)).

43 5 U.S. 4 75,

v.

United

In Wood v.

States,

Georgia,

450

U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held
that a conflict situation which is not addressed by the trial court
requires reversal: "Sullivan

mandates a reversal when the trial court

has failed to make an inquiry even though it "knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict exists.'"

Id.

at 272 n.18,

101 S.Ct. at 1104 n.18 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cuyler,
U.S.

at

347, 100 S.Ct.

at

1717).

Similarly, when

a

446

conflict

situation becomes apparent to the State, it "has a duty to bring the
issue

to

the

court's

attention

disqualification of counsel."
States

v.

Agurs,

latum,

and,

if

necessary,

move

943 F.2d at 379-80; Cf.

for
United

427 U.S. 97, 110-11, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (1976).
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The conflict of interest issue was arguably raised to the trial
court

in the course of the in-chambers conference

initiated by

Defendant, in which Defendant vigorously complained about

trial

counsel's lack of preparation of Defendant for trial (R. 93-101, Jury
Trial Transcript (Volume I)). However, to the extent that it might
not have been raised to the trial court, the plain error and/or
exceptional circumstances analysis previously cited in the foregoing
argument on the waiver of the constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel is applicable.

Therefore, this Court should address the

conflict of interest issue due to both the fundamental constitutional
right involved and the exceptional circumstances involving a pro se
litigant who was unaware of the consequences of such a conflict of
interest on his right to self-representation.
In the instant case, the trial court, after an extensive inchambers discussion concerning Defendant's vigorous complaint about
trial counsel's lack of preparation, appointed trial counsel as
standby counsel to assist defendant
representation
During

(R. 101-102, Jury

the previously

mentioned

in the course of his self-

Trial

Transcript

in-chambers

(Volume I)).

conference,

it was

obvious that a conflict of interest existed between trial counsel and
Defendant (See R. 94, Jury Trial Transcript, (Volume I), where trial
counsel states that Defendant's complaint about preparation "puts me
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in an awkward situation, because

I am here to represent him.")

Further,

in chambers, subsequently

the

trial

court, while

made

findings on the record concerning the dispute between trial counsel
and Defendant as to trial counsel's preparation for trial (R. 101,
lines

12-23,

Jury Trial

Transcript

(Volume

I)).

Finally,

the

prosecutor, who was also present during the in-chambers conference,
made representations to the court that trial counsel was in fact
prepared for trial (R. 101, lines 1-11, Jury Trial Transcript (Volume

D) .
At the point the conflict of interest was brought to the trial
court's attention, it had the responsibility to investigate further,
to advise Defendant personally, and to obtain a knowing waiver of the
conflict before appointing trial counsel as standby counsel to assist
Defendant during the course of the jury trial.
at 379.

See

Tatum,

943 F.2d

As a result of these failures, the trial court breached the

duty it had to preserve Defendant's right to self-representation,
especially in light of the expectation of reliance on standby counsel
created by the trial court by its appointment of trial counsel to
assist Defendant during the jury trial.
As a result of the in-chambers dispute as to whether trial
counsel

adequately

prepared

for

arose

substantial

questions about the existence of a conflict of interest.

Here, trial
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trial, there

counsel, as standby counsel, harbored substantial personal interests
involving

potential

interests

to avoid

discipline

by way

of a

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that conflicted with the
clear objective
standby

counsel.

and ethical responsibility of representation as
Trial counsel's

involvement

in this

capacity

required him to account to two masters with conflicting interests,
not to mention any personal reservations that might have existed due
to the dispute concerning preparation for trial.
instant

The record in the

case is completely devoid of any indication that trial

counsel assisted Defendant as standby counsel during the course of
the jury trial (R. 60-500, Jury Trial Transcript (Volumes I and II)).
In fact, just prior to Closing Arguments, former trial counsel, as
standby counsel, asked that he be excused inasmuch as he felt that
Defendant would not need legal advice for Closing Arguments (R. 462,
Jury Trial Transcript
denied.

(Volume II)), which request the trial court

Consequently, an actual conflict of interest existed and

Defendant need not show prejudice to prevail.
at 488 (citing Cuyler,

See Johnson,

823 P.2d

446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the failure of the trial court to
address the surrounding circumstances of the conflict of interest
situation requires reversal inasmuch as the trial court knew or
reasonably should have known of the particular conflict of interest
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between Defendant and trial counsel.

Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 n. 18,

101 S.Ct. at 1104 n.18 (quoting Cuyler,

446 U.S. at 347, 100 S. Ct. at

1717) .

Additionally, the State failed in its duty to bring the

conflict of interest issue to the trial court's attention.
Tatum,

943 F.2d at 379-80; Cf. Agurs,

See

427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at

2401.

CONCISION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial so
that Defendant might be receive, among other things, proper advise as
to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation for a valid
waiver and, if Defendant chooses to represent himself, so that the
conflict of interest issue can be adequately addressed and resolved
to preserve Defendant's right to self-representation.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD QF DIgPQSITIQN
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel and the valid waiver of such, which is a
matter of continuing public interest and involves issues requiring
45

further development

in the area of criminal

law.

Counsel

for

Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official
Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ifclfl day of January, 1996.
!GREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

at

WULktw
Wigc
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage
prepaid, to the following, on this \(qfp day of January, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTN: Criminal Appeals Division
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Jaake City, UT 84114
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ADDENDUM
NONE
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